Q. “Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then is he impotent? Is he able but not willing? Then is he malevolent? Is he both able and willing? Whence is he evil?”[1] Can the theist provide a satisfactory response to Philo’s problem?
In this dissertation I shall consider several proposed solutions to the problem of evil. I aim to establish how these solutions fail to reconcile the belief in the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and Omni benevolent God with the existence of evil. I will show that belief in a God of this sort is irrational, as it cannot be held unless the theist embraces logically contradictory claims. I shall examine two types of theodicy, and consider if either type can solve the theist's dilemma. I shall consider possible defences of the theist’s position and demonstrate how they fail. Once it has been shown that these two solutions to the problem of evil fail, I shall turn my attention to the claim that God is omnipotent. I will aim to establish that even if a rationally defensible theodicy could be found to resolve belief in the existence of God with evil, this theodicy would not be consistent with belief that God is omnipotent according to the interpretation of 'omnipotence' as outlined by Mackie.
When discussing the problem of evil, it is prudent to make clear certain claims. Firstly the claim that God is omnipotent, omniscient and Omni benevolent. If this claim is not held, the Philo need not pose his problem. Once we have accepted this, we must categorise what we mean by omnipotence, omniscience, and Omni benevolence. Omniscience is the least important of the terms and is usually incorporated into omnipotence. For our purposes its definition simply means that God knows everything.[2] Omni benevolence, as J. L. Mackie defines it, means that a benevolent thing opposes evil in as much as it can, so an Omni benevolent being will always oppose evil. Mackie defines omnipotence as the ability to do anything, which is logically conceivable. The problem of evil as Mackie defines it runs as follows,
- God is omnipotent
- God is Omni benevolent
- Omnipotence means the ability to do anything which is logically conceivable
- Omni benevolent means always opposing evil
- Therefore God would not allow evil.
- Evil exists
- Therefore God, as defined in the premises, does not exist.[3]
Mackie concludes from his argument that given the truth of all the premises, God does not exist. It should be noted that by this, Mackie does not mean there cannot be a divine creator, simply that He cannot be both omnipotent and Omni benevolent. I shall aim to further strengthen Mackie’s conclusions during the course of this dissertation.
Nelson Pike comments that Mackie’s argument is lacking a vital premise, namely that God would have no morally sufficient reason to permit evil.[4] Just as the pain of chemotherapy is permissible because it cures cancer, God may have a reason for permitting the evils that befall our world. If He does, then Philo’s problem is answered, for He is none of the suggestions. This can also be characterised as stating that Omni benevolence is always opposing the greatest evil, so the lesser evil is permitted if and only if it serves to prevent the greater evil. However, in accordance with our definition of omnipotence for God to have a sufficient reason to permit evil, it must be a logical impossibility for God to acquire whatever means are acquired by any other method. In short that God would have no morally sufficient reasons to permit evil must be a necessary truth.[5] We can identify two types of theodicy that may prove to be morally sufficient reasons for God’s allowance of evil. Firstly the protection of a future good that outweighs the evil permitted, and secondly the protection of a prior good that outweighs the evil permitted.[6] We shall examine these in turn to determine if either can indeed resolve the theist’s dilemma.
Firstly, let us look at the suggestion that the protection of a future good would be a morally sufficient reason. As God is omniscient then He knows what effects certain acts will have. Hence if an evil act would promote a good act, or indeed many good acts, that is more valuable than the evil act, then He would be morally permitted to allow it. This means that permitting the evil to allow a better good is actually better than preventing the evil, and consequently the good. Compare this stance to our chemotherapy patient. Suppose in this scenario, we have exceptionally good reason to believe that with chemotherapy the patient’s cancer will be cured and that they will regain full health. We would class this as a greater future good. But we also know that the only way this future good is possible is through chemotherapy. So in order to obtain full health, we have to permit chemotherapy. However, as this is the only way to obtain the greater good it is permissible. This line of thinking is more commonly known as the theodicy that God permits evil as it allows goods which otherwise would not exist, hence the world is better with some evil in it than without.
Mackie offers an evaluation of this theodicy, characterising it as such:
Pain and suffering are first order evils, and in contrast to these are pleasure and happiness, which are first order goods. First order evils allow the existence of sympathy, generosity, charity and other such goods, which are classed as second order goods. God permits first order evils because they allow second order goods.[7] Does this offer a morally permissible reason for God to allow evil? I do not think it does. Firstly it commits the theist to saying that second order goods are in fact better than first order goods. Certainly many theists do advocate that hedonist pleasure is not the greatest good, and there may be grounds to grant this. But happiness in the absence of evil, or love, both first order goods, seems to me to be better than second order goods. Herein lies the problem. The value of good in this case is subjective. The theist claims that second order goods are better whilst others may claim first order goods are better. If we could be sure of the objectivity of the value of goods then such a claim either way could be supported, however only God could tell us of this. If we could prove that second order goods are better, the theist then finds himself in a contradictory position. We either have a duty to limit first order evils or not. He cannot advocate the eradication of first order evils, pain and suffering, as this would dry up the availability of second order goods. In exorcising second order goods, we are actually making the world worse off. If we do have an obligation to limit the first order evils, then the original justification for them turns out to be false. H. J. McCloskey notes that the theist should in fact regret the progress of science and technology in alleviating the pain and suffering of the world, as they have reduced the possibility for many greater second order goods.[8]
Mackie himself also outlines several reasons why this account of why God permits evil is implausible. Firstly, the theist has shifted the definition of what it is to be benevolent. Our original definition states a benevolent being will reduce evil as much as it can. However, if this theodicy is correct, then is God not trying to reduce first order evils, but trying to increase second order goods.[9] The theist is in a dilemma over what God is actually doing; decreasing first order evils, or increasing second order goods. The theist has to say He is increasing second order goods; otherwise his justification for evil falls apart. And this is not reducing evil as much as one can. The theist has changed the definition of God. Secondly, the theodicy creates an infinite regress. It should be clear that as first order evils give rise to second order goods, similarly first order goods will give rise to second order evils, such as cowardice, jealousy, ignorance, etc. In order for consistency, these second order evils have to be considered worse than the first order evils. So it now seems we should concern ourselves with limiting second order evils. This would be done through the existence of third order goods, which arise from second order evils. Third order goods again must be considered better than second order goods. It is clear that this leads to an infinite regress, which severely damages the account, as we can never be sure which goods we should be promoting.[10]
It has been shown in the previous paragraphs that the suggestion of protecting a future good is not a morally sufficient reason for God to allow evils. We cannot say with any certainty that second order goods are to be preferred to first order goods. Even if we could, the theist must regard the elimination of first order evils as a bad thing, and this places him in a contradictory position. We have shown how the theist has changed the definition of God, so it no longer entails He is Omni benevolent. And we have seen that this theodicy leads inescapably to an infinite regress, rendering it unable to justify God’s allowance of evil.
We now turn our attention to the second type of theodicy, that in allowing evils God is protecting a prior good. This prior good is free will. On this account, free will’s value must outweigh every actual and possible evil that has occurred or could occur, a statement, which is at first glance debatable. W. D. Niven asks, “Which is preferable – a grim fight with the possibility of splendid triumph; or no battle at all?”[11] Niven’s thoughts when applied to the issue of free will and evil present us with a choice between a world that contains free will and evil that can be overcome through a struggle or a world that contains no free will and no evil. The free will theodicy tells us that we should favour the first choice as a world with free will is better than one without, no matter how blissful that latter world may be. This seems to me an irrational position to take because in any case, surely the burden of proof is on the supporter of the free will defence to show why free will is to be valued so highly.[12]
However, whilst it is far from conclusive, many do regard free will as something of high, maybe even the highest, value. In light of this we shall reluctantly proceed as though the answer to Niven’s question is that a grim fight would be better than no battle at all. If we cast our minds back to our original definition of a morally sufficient reason, it has to be such that the good cannot be brought about in any other way. And when we consider that God, as we have defined him, is omnipotent, meaning He can do anything that is logically possible, we are then left to conclude that the only logically possible way to permit free will is to allow the occurrence of future evils caused by the abuse of it.
Is this necessarily so however? Could God not have made humans so that they possess the capacity to freely choose evil, but that they never did so? History presents us with people who never acted wrongly. Jesus and Mother Teresa are two well-known examples, who lived completely moral lives. Now if we allow that both Jesus and Mother Teresa in fact did no wrong, are we to then say they were not free? For the free will defender the possibility that God could create free men who always choose good must be impossible, otherwise God could have brought about free will without evil, hence nullifying the justification of it. In addressing this issue, we must first determine whether complete moral goodness is possible in the absence of evil.
Ninian Smart states that if humans were wholly good, then the ascription of goodness would be unintelligible.[13] He claims that the term good, is connected with concepts such as courage, generosity and so forth. So that when we recognise X’s goodness we are recognising these concepts in them. He also claims that overcoming temptation is what makes acting in the right way commendable. So that a person who does a good act in the face of temptation is to be commended more than one who does it without such temptation.[14]
Smart is advocating that without the existence of evils, the concept of wholly good beings is unintelligible. I feel that this view is mistaken. The distinction between different kinds of goods and evils is a purely human concept. We understand concepts such as courage and generosity because we can see their opposites, cowardice and selfishness. If however humans never showed examples of cowardice or selfishness, that would not mean that courage and generosity ceased to exist, simply that we could not identify them, because there would be no need for such a distinction. If all the acts of the world were ‘good’ as we understand it, then there wouldn’t be any need for the distinction between good and evil, but it would not detract from the fact that ‘good’ was still being done. Does a good act have to be recognised as such, for it to count as good? Smart seems to think so, but I would argue that a man could act in a way that was good, without knowing so. In response to the claim that a good act done in the face of temptation is better than one done without such temptation, I would argue this again is mistaken. Smart describes a Utopia where the inhabitants are never tempted nor desire to do.[15] He asks why we should call the inhabitants of this utopia good, as they do not display courage, or generosity, nor do they resist temptations. However their lack of courage and generosity is simply because such things are not required, due to the lack of evil. Again we are reverting back to the situation of second order goods, which has been shown to be inadequate.
Smart also claims that because the inhabitants do not resist the temptations to err, that they cannot be claimed to be good. Regardless of the motives, an act can still be good. For example, John is hungry. John notices an unguarded watermelon on the fruit stall and the thought of stealing it to satisfy his hunger crosses his mind. However John concludes that the negatives of stealing the watermelon far outweigh the positives and so he refrains from stealing it. Jim on the other hand is a watermelon fanatic, and upon seeing the watermelon is overcome by huge temptation to steal it. However Jim knows that stealing is wrong and so resists the great temptation. Both have done the exact same act, albeit with different motives, and levels of temptation.
Smart wants to say the second act is better than the first, however I do not believe it so. Both acts are the same, so both should be equally valued. In dealing with evil, we are dealing with the act, not the desires that motivate the act. If we were to take Smart’s stance then it would be plausible that evil acts caused by good motives would be good, or at least better than those acts caused by evil motives. This is akin to saying ‘X meant well’. While that might very well be true, it is the end result, the action, that is judged and that we are concerning ourselves with.
So we have determined that a wholly good person is possible without the existence of evil. The question now is whether they can be both wholly good and free. Essentially what is at stake here is whether free will is compatible with determinism. If we believe that God causes us to act right, then do we have free will at all? I aim to show that acting consistently right is compatible with free will. We must first define what we mean by free will. Anthony Flew suggests that free will does not necessarily need to involve unpredictability or a lack of causation.[16] Indeed to be able to say that a person could have acted differently isn’t to say his actions were unpredictable or uncaused, it simply means there were other options open to him. Flew states that to say X could have helped doing something is to say that if X had chosen to act otherwise, he would have been able to. Flew believes that providing we act on causes from within our own nature, then we are free. Only when we act on causes from out with our own nature do we lose our free will, because we are being coerced. Flew believes we cannot be bound by our own nature as it is our own. If we accept causation, then every act will have a cause and effect. My freedom is not in being able to act uncaused, as this is impossible; it is in being able to choose which causes to act on. If we take a simple example, where only two possible actions exist, we can see where my free will comes to effect. I have the choice to type or not to type. No other action is possible here. Now clearly there will be causes for me to type, and causes for me to not type. However without me, as the free agent in the middle, nothing will become of these causes. I act on one or the other. The free will is my ability to choose. If I cannot choose, then I am not free. As Flew notes, positions such as this exist within theistic positions such as the Catholic doctrine that God’s foreknowledge covering all human behaviour is not incompatible with free will.[17] So it appears the theist is guilty of double standards.
Can we then say that it is logically possible for God to have allowed free will without it entailing evil? Alvin Plantinga writes that ‘to create creatures capable of moral good, He must create creatures of moral evil; but He cannot create the possibility of moral evil and at the same time prohibit its actuality.’[18] Plantinga picks up on Flew’s point that the free will defender is not using the term free correctly. He claims that Flew’s objection is defused if we substitute the word ‘free’ with the word ‘unfettered’. Hence a world where unfettered humans do both good and bad is better than a world where fettered men do only good acts.[19] However I feel that Plantinga is missing the point. Determinism does not entail that humans are fettered into their actions. Causes are not something that binds a person to a particular action; it is inevitable that every action will have a cause. Causes give reasons for actions, but they themselves cannot motivate. It is important to note the distinction between a cause and a motive. Plantinga is implying that causal determinism means we are shackled by the causes of our actions, this however ignores that we choose which cause to act upon.
Mackie raises an important point that if our actions are not caused by our character, then they are reduced to randomness.[20] If the theist’s account of free will is true then God is not responsible for evil. But can this account of random free will really be the greatest good such that we can justify God’s allowance of evil? Mackie would argue no, and I’m inclined to agree with him. The theist gives an inadequate account of what free will is.
Defenders of the free will defence can be accused of equating determinism with predestination. In response to Flew’s suggestion that free will is compatible with determinism the theist may state that what Flew has shown is that there is no contradiction in the idea of men always freely being morally good although their behaviour followed the laws of nature and thus determined by those laws. He has not however shown that there is no contradiction in God arranging things so that all men would always freely be morally good.[21] The first instance describes causal determinism, which we have already shown to be compatible with free will. The second instance however refers to divine predestination. Predestination implies that whenever we act we have no choice in that action, it was already pre chosen. By making this distinction the theist is stating that the world is in fact predestined. For if it was not then it would be possible for God to create men so that they could always freely choose good as we have shown. And if this were possible then God would have no morally sufficient reason for allowing evil to protect human free will, as free will could be protected through other means. Flew compares the idea of predestination to being hypnotised by God, stating that the hypnotist can only be held responsible for the actions of his hypnotised victims if they did not consent to the hypnosis.[22] However clearly in the case of a creator God, this kind of escape from responsibility is not applicable. If God created us, already under the ‘spell’ of predestination, we could not consent to it. This implies that, if the world is predestined then human beings cannot be held responsible for their actions. Flew believes that predestination and free will are compatible.[23] As mentioned previously he believes that the meaning of ‘acting freely’ is that we act based on causes from within ourselves and without compulsion, not acting predictably or without cause. I would disagree with Flew’s definition of freedom, as there has to be some excursion of choice involved. However regardless of this Flew demonstrates that the theist cannot defend the free will defence by reverting to a predestined view of the world. If predestination is not compatible with free will then there is no free will, hence God has no morally sufficient reason for permitting evil. If predestination is compatible with free will, then it is not so that God could only protect free will by allowing evil, and again He has no morally sufficient reason to allow it.
We have shown that free will is compatible with determinism, and that predestination is not a viable option for the theist. There is however another possible morally sufficient reason for God to allow evil. McCloskey examines the claim that goods made possible by free will justify evil. Here the claim is that free will, in itself is not the aim, but the goods that it allows, most importantly the triumph over evil. This avoids the problem of claiming that free will is to be desired above all things. However we still need to show that the allowance of evil is the only logical way to bring about these goods. Let us suppose that the theist succeeds in showing this, and that there is no other way the goods generated by free will could be achieved. There is still however no conclusive proof that this is a morally sufficient reason. Again the problem for the theist is showing that the goods made possible by free will are better than those not. Mackie’s objection still stands, all that has been changed is that free will is making possible some second order goods, rather than evil.[24] The position still reverts to an inescapable infinite regress.
As with the claim of greater goods being achieved by overcoming evils, it seems that we are being advised to seek out and overcome evils. This does not seem in line with human nature, which typically strives to avoid evil. Even if we grant that God makes great goods available to humans at the cost of some evil is a plausible reason; it is still reliant upon showing that the number of people who take advantage of the goods allowed by free will outweighs the amount of evil that occurs as a result of free will.[25] If more evil occurred then we would expect God to remove the free will, and conclude that it was a failed experiment. This is obviously impossible to show either way, and hence the theodicy can only provide at best a possible justification, not a certain justification.
McCloskey notes it is essential to the problem of evil that every instance of evil is accounted for by a morally sufficient reason. Hence if we grant that the preservation of free will is a morally sufficient reason it has to account for every possible instance of evil to succeed. If we can establish one instance where free will does not account for the evil act, then the problem is still intact.
This entails that any given act of evil must have a point to it, namely that it protects free will. If it does not then we have established an instance where there is no morally sufficient reason for evil. William Rowe’s famous example of ‘Bambi’ serves this point well.[26] In Rowe’s example, Bambi is a fawn burned alive in a forest fire, whose suffering has no connections to any observed greater good, or prevention of a worse evil. Now, Rowe correctly notes that this in itself does not prove that there is an instance of evil, which has no morally sufficient reason, as we cannot show there are definitely no connections to the preservation of free will, because we lack omnipotence. However whilst we cannot conclusively prove that Bambi’s suffering is pointless, Rowe believes it is rational to believe it so.[27] In the case of the fawn, it seems rational to believe that there is no protection of free will, hence no morally sufficient reason. Rowe remarks that in light of our experiences, where we can imagine and encounter seemingly pointless evils, it seems absurd to think that every instance of suffering has a morally sufficient reason. Just as we rationally believe that the sun will rise each morning, we can rationally conclude that there are no morally sufficient reasons for God’s allowance of evil.[28]
Keith Yandell responds that we cannot conclude that there is no morally sufficient reason for God’s allowance of evil. He responds to Rowe by stating that if we are to claim there exist apparently pointless evils, such as the case of ‘Bambi’, then it must be true that if an evil has a point, it will be apparent to us otherwise we could not confidently claim it to be pointless.[29] He claims that the purposes of God may be beyond our comprehension, and hence if God allows evils for a purpose, we may not be able to know what that purpose is. Now if we accept this we have to ask, why would God keep the reason a secret? If He were Omni benevolent, then surely telling us why He has permitted these great evils to befall us would be a good thing? For one, it would end much of the debate about His nature and existence. God can be accused of keeping us in a torture chamber, whilst assuring us that our presence there has a good reason, but that we would not understand that reason. Our definition of omnipotence states that God cannot do what is not logically possible; hence it must be that God’s morally sufficient reason is within the realms of logic. If this is the case, and indeed it must be, for if God could bend the rules of logic then the free will theodicy is defeated as He could create free men who always do right, then it must be possible for us to understand God’s reason as it is within the realms of logic. Even if we could not come to understand ourselves, we must still be able to comprehend it if it was fully explained to us. And God, being Omni benevolent would have no reason not to explain his reasons. This leads us to conclude that either there is no morally sufficient reason, or that God is not Omni benevolent.
The above criticism of the free will theodicy is that the reasons for evil being permitted are unknown to us and only to God. This puts us in the position of choosing between there being instances of evil which an omnipotent, omniscient and Omni benevolent being has a morally sufficient reason for allowing and there being instances of evil which an omnipotent, omniscient and Omni benevolent being has no morally sufficient reason for allowing. Without further evidence for either stance, I would argue that the latter is more likely. As Philo concludes in his discussion with Cleanthes and Demea, we cannot rationally conclude the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and Omni benevolent creator from the world we are faced with.[30] Indeed Hume writes that the fact we know we cannot understand God’s reason does not make the argument more rational.[31]
While we have seen the problems the theist faces in reverting to a position of an unknown morally sufficient reason, this position is often held. Terence Penelhum notes that any theodicy offered would have to be compatible with God’s omnipotence, omniscience and Omni benevolence.[32] He asserts that when we label someone as morally good it is dependent upon his or her observed behaviour. If they act in a way that matches our own moral standards then we will label them good, if they do not, then we will not. In calling someone good, the standards they conform to must be the ones we hold ourselves, although we do not necessarily have to display them. The same applies to God.[33] A similar principle applies in regards to moral authorities. If I accept someone, for instance the Pope, as an authority figure on moral matters, then when he makes moral decisions, I must adjust my own beliefs in accordance with this. Otherwise I will have contradictory beliefs, i.e. that the Pope is someone whose decisions should be followed but that this particular decision is wrong.[34] Similarly inconsistencies would arise if a moral decision made by God did not hold with the moral principles the theist held previously.[35] So what ever morally sufficient reason God could have for permitting evil, has to be in accordance with the theists own moral codes, in order to avoid contradiction.
This is why, Penelhum argues, that agnosticism regarding God having a morally sufficient reason for evil is not a viable position. For if no morally sufficient reason can be found within a system of beliefs, for instance Christianity, and yet that set of beliefs is consistent with the moral authority, God, then it must be that there is no morally sufficient reason, as that system is adopted from God. The theist is faced with two possibilities, either there is no morally sufficient reason for evil, which entails God cannot consistently be omnipotent, omniscient and Omni benevolent, or they can admit that the system of beliefs is wrong.
The free will defence is not capable of answering the problem of evil without contradiction. We have seen how the theist cannot claim that God could not bring about a world where men freely always chose good without reverting to a position of predestination, which is not a viable position. We have seen how it is rational to believe that there are instances of pointless suffering, and that if there were a reason, an Omni benevolent God would share it with us. We have seen how the theist cannot remain agnostic about God’s morally sufficient reason without either admitting God is wrong, or that their system of beliefs is wrong. One further contradiction arises when we consider the claim that deliberately not intervening to stop an act of evil is itself morally wrong. If this claim is correct, and indeed it is emphasised in many religious traditions, then an omniscient God would be a bystander on every occasion where an act of evil was committed and so it would be not only right for him to intervene, but a moral obligation. As evil acts are present in the world, we can conclude that God does not completely intervene on these occasions, although it is possible there are occasions where He does. By completely intervene I mean such that the evil is completely eliminated. It may be possible that God does try to stop evil, and succeeds in making them better than they would have been without His intervention, but on this view we would have to conclude that God cannot be omnipotent, as He cannot completely intervene. As we have seen already an Omni benevolent God would require a morally sufficient reason to not intervene, and this reason is the protection of free will. But this raises the dilemma of which person’s free will is to be protected. Should God protect the free will of the rapist over the free will of the rape victim? If we state that both should be protected then the theist cannot claim it is right to intervene to prevent evil acts. By doing nothing God protects free will, but we must conclude He is either not Omni benevolent as He doesn’t always wish to intervene, which we have already stated is better, or that He is not omnipotent and cannot completely intervene.
Another contradiction that the free will argument entails is that God’s refusal to intervene on occasions of evil must entail that a wrong free act is better than a right un-free act.[36] However this goes against what is said about sin in other contexts, for if any free act is good, then how can free sin be wrong? If the freedom to do what is wrong is good, then how can acting on that freedom be seen as bad? Sin could be wrong in regards to other good free acts, but it cannot be regarded as the greatest evil, for that must be a lack of freedom.
The free will theodicy, despite the problems it faces, remains a popular response to the problem of evil. In this next section we shall examine a defence of the free will theodicy. By claiming that God is omnipotent, it follows that God can create any logically possible state of affairs. Plantinga argues that if this is true then it entails the truth of the following; that there are men who are not created by God is a logically possible state of affairs. And this in turn entails; If God is omnipotent then he can create men not created by him.[37] Now it seems to me that Plantinga’s first claim, if true, would mean that the theist’s claim that God created the universe, thus everything in it, would be false. If God is to be described as an omnipotent creator, or the ‘first cause’, then it seems that the existence of men who are not created by God is not logically possible. However if we grant that it is a logically possible state of affairs then Plantinga argues that the claim that God can create any state of affairs needs to be amended such that God can create any state of affairs (S) such that God creates (S) is consistent.[38] He then claims that when this is taken with the claim that all men could always freely choose good is a logically possible state of affair, it does not entail that God can create free men who always choose good. This can only be true if God creates men who always freely choose good is consistent.[39] He then equates this statement with the claim that God creates free men and brings about that they always freely choose good. Again Plantinga is guilty of confusing determinism with predestination, and hence fails in his objection.
Plantinga’s famous defence of the free will concerns transworld depravity. He claims that for any action (A) that a person (P) will have to make a moral choice about there is a possible situation (S) where P will choose wrongly in regards to A. Possible situations in this context refer to possible worlds. Plantinga writes, “If S were actual P would go wrong with respect to A.”[40] What this entails is that if God chose to create some world (W) where (P) did no wrong, then (S) would occur in the actual world and (P) would go wrong with respect to (A). And then it would turn out that God didn't create (W) after all, because (P) does no moral wrong in (W). Plantinga claims that it is at least possible that everybody suffers from transworld depravity and if that is the case, then it will not be possible for him to bring about a world with moral good, but no moral evil. Important to Plantinga’s theory is not the truth of this claim, but merely the possibility of it. It deals with the necessity of the claim ‘God could have made men such that they always freely choose good’. If the free will defence is to be shown false, then this claim has to be necessarily true. However what Plantinga has shown is that it is possible that it is not true, so it cannot be necessarily true. Plantinga, has been credited with solving the logical problem of evil, however he does not solve the evidential problem.
Whilst this solution is possible, it is by no means clear that it is actual, and certainly it is not rational that we should accept it as such. However we shall proceed as though the free will defence does provide a morally sufficient reason for God to allow evil. What I aim to show is that free will is incompatible with omnipotence, omniscience and Omni benevolence, and that even if the free will defence succeeds in answering the problem of evil, it still entails that God is not as initially defined by Mackie.
Now if we consider the free will defence as true, and that evil is a result of human free choice, then we must conclude that God knows that giving humans free will, will incur some evil. So He knows that some of the people He creates will in fact live a life of sin, and never experience the goods made possible by free will, or be worthy of salvation. Now the question is if God knows this to be true, then why would He create these people, knowing full well that they will be condemned to a life of misery and then an eternal damnation in Hell?[41]
Consider this analogy; overcoming an addiction, such as cigarettes, may be considered a moral good. Now a morally motivated tobacco company decides they want to increase this good, and so release a highly addictive new cigarette, dubbed a ‘superette’. They know that many people will not have the will power, or mental aptitude to quit, and will become fatally addicted. However some people will quit and experience the good that this brings. Now imagine that the ‘superette’ was not a choice, but enforced on everyone at birth. We can equate Gods ‘gift’ of free will to the imposed ‘superette’. We did not ask for it, but yet are punished for misusing it; similarly we did not ask to be addicted but are punished for not overcoming it. God puts the temptation to do wrong in front of billions of people, fully aware that most of them will succumb to it. Now it might be suggested that God cannot know which persons will turn out evil, as that choice is down to the individual person. This claim however seems to contradict God’s omniscience, as there are now things God does not know. And as previously mentioned certain theistic positions claim that God has foreknowledge over all human actions. Even if it is not, it remains however that if God cannot guarantee the creation of completely moral free creatures, which as Plantinga argues He cannot, then if He is Omni benevolent He should refrain from creation altogether as if there are no human beings, then not granting them free will cannot be an evil. Free will can only be the greatest good if there is someone to exercise it. So if the theist regards life as the greatest good, then the free will defence fails, as it would be better to have any life, free or un-free, than no life at all. As life does exist we can conclude that God is not Omni benevolent, and rather is much like Hume characterises Him ‘… [God] has no more regard to good above ill than to heat above cold, or to drought above moisture, or to light above heavy.’[42]
Hume believes that we cannot prove a conclusion of unmixed phenomena, from evidence of mixed phenomena.[43] By this he means that we cannot infer the existence of an Omni benevolent, or Omni malevolent God because the world contains both properties. This leaves the possibility of God being both good and evil, although Hume believes that the uniformity and steadiness of general law seems to oppose this stance, as God could not be both together.[44] Hence it is probable, Hume believes, that if God does exist then He would possess neither benevolence, nor malevolence.
The failings of the free will theodicy have been exposed, along with the contradictions its truth would entail. We have examined a possible defence of the theodicy and concluded that while it might resolve the logical problem; it does not resolve the evidential problem. We have also shown that even if the free will theodicy does provide a morally sufficient reason for God’s allowance of evil, it is incompatible with an omniscient, omnipotent and Omni benevolent creator, and one of these qualities must be abandoned, most likely Omni benevolence. However as McCloskey notes, much of these objections give too much credit to the free will defender.[45] We shall now examine perhaps a more obvious objection to the free will theodicy.
This objection regards the distinction between natural and moral evil. If the free will defence is true then we have a morally sufficient reason for evil providing that it protects human free will. But as Flew points out, not all evil in the world can be traced back to an origin in human wickedness caused by the misuse of free will.[46] The occurrence of natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis and hurricanes are not the result of human free will. Neither are diseases such as AIDS, cancer and influenza. Indeed the presence of these things leads Philo to comment, ‘One would imagine that this grand production had not received the last hand of the maker.’[47]
Now clearly as before, God needs to have a morally sufficient reason for permitting these natural evils. I shall examine two of the more popular reasons given. Firstly, that the natural laws which govern the planet are responsible for evil. This explanation would mean that earthquakes are simply a regrettable side effect of the earth’s tectonic plates moving; similarly hurricanes are a side effect of the need for global winds. However, this explanation is far from sufficient. Firstly it does not cover all natural evils, as there seems to be no need for diseases under natural law.[48] And Hume notes that even natural functions of the earth, such as rain and wind, do not have to turn into disasters such as monsoons and hurricanes. These functions may be necessarily but very often they fail to do what they were designed for.[49] And more importantly the theist offers no explanation why God could not intervene on occasions of natural evil, as it would not limit any free will, nor would it go against natural law, as He would merely be preventing the effects from reaching us. It could be stated that His intervention would go against the existence of natural laws and would devalue them, but surely this is the lesser of two evils. It seems that God’s policy of non-intervention is either down to his lack of omnipotence, or lack of Omni benevolence.
A similar explanation to the problem of moral evil is also offered in regards to the problem of natural evil. The claim is that natural evil increases the total good by allowing charity, bravery, sympathy, etc. This is comparable to the claim that second order goods are better than first order goods. McCloskey raises several objections to this stance.[50] Firstly, that it does not set a limit on what the desirable level of evil is hence we cannot know which evils are justified and which are not. Secondly, if natural evil is means to a greater good; i.e. disease as a means to charity, sympathy, and so forth; then what of occasions where this good goes un-actualised. Is the possibility of moral good coming out of natural evil justification for it? This kind of justification would seem to be very weak, especially considering God’s omniscience would mean He would know which natural evils would be capitalised upon. Thirdly, stating that because a greater good follows a natural evil does not imply that the natural evil caused the greater good. It is invalid logic and needs more proof from the theist that this is indeed the case.
So now we have shown that the free will theodicy breaks down on several objections we shall turn our attention to a fatal blow to God’s omnipotence; the Paradox of Omnipotence. Mackie revisits this age-old dilemma by asking if an omnipotent being can create beings, which it cannot subsequently control, or create laws, which subsequently bind it.[51] So if God can creates men with free will, then He can no longer be omnipotent, and if He can’t create men with free will, then providing it is not a logically impossibility, He cannot be omnipotent. Now clearly the free will defender has to admit that creating men with free will is a logical possibility, otherwise the defence would be absurd. So if God can create men with free will, and does so, then He can no longer be omnipotent. This is reliant on the claim that to possess free will is to be free from forced action by a third party. So if God were to control us, we would not have free will, and again the free will theodicy would fail to provide a morally sufficient reason for evil. The paradox shows us that the traditional definition of God’s omnipotence cannot be meaningfully attributed to God. Clearly it is not true that God can do anything that is logically possible and remain omnipotent.
We can distinguish between two types of omnipotence; firstly the unlimited power to act, and secondly the unlimited power to determine what powers to act things shall have; O.1 and O.2 respectively.[52] What we can conclude is that God cannot continuously possess O.1 for if we claim God to have O.1, and then the paradox arises. However if God has O.1 and O.2 simultaneously then we avoid the paradox. This is because God can use O.2 to assign independent powers, such as human free will, but it limits His own power, meaning He does not have O.1 anymore but still retains O.2.[53] To Mackie at least the problem of evil is resolved by denying God’s omnipotence.
If we return to Philo’s original problem, then we have seen that the theist cannot provide a satisfactory response. In the course of this dissertation we have assessed two types of theodicy offered in response to the problem of evil. The first was the protection of a future good, which was shown to be implausible due to the subjectivity of the claims and the inevitable retreat to an infinite regress. Secondly was the protection of a prior good. Here we examined the ‘free will defence’ in great detail, showing how the theist must offer conclusive reasons why free will is to be valued above all. I have shown that the free will theodicy can only at best provide possible justification, and that despite this it is still irrational to believe in an omnipotent, omniscient and Omni benevolent God. Finally we addressed the claim that God is omnipotent. We have seen that the theist must address his definition of omnipotence, as it results in a paradoxical state. If we admit that God cannot be omnipotent, in the sense traditionally described, then we can resolve the problem of evil.
[1] David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, part X, pp. 22-3
[2] Although omniscience does become important when we discuss God’s knowledge that free will would lead to evil, which we shall discuss below.
[3] J. L. Mackie, ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, Mind, Vol. LXIV, No. 254, pg. 26
[4] Nelson Pike, ‘Hume on Evil’, The Philosophical Review, No. 72, pg. 41
[5] Ibid, pg. 42
[6] Ibid, pg. 43
[7] Mackie, ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, pg. 31
[8] H. J. McCloskey, ‘God and Evil’, Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. X, No. 39, pg. 75
[9] Mackie, ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, pg. 31
[10] Ibid, pg. 32
[11] W. D. Niven, ‘Good and Evil’, quoted in McCloskey, ‘God and Evil’, pg. 73
[12] Free will as the ultimate good raises further problems for the theist, which shall be addressed below. In regards to free will being better than no free will, it is possible that the illusion of free will could be a desired position, so long as it could be guaranteed that the illusion would not be shattered. So God could provide the illusion of free will, and prevent evil.
[13] Ninian Smart, ‘Omnipotence, Evil and Supermen’, in Nelson Pike (ed.), God and Evil: Readings on the Theological Problem of Evil, (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1964), pg. 106
[14] Ibid, pg. 105
[15] Ibid, pg. 108
[16] Anthony Flew, ‘Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom’, in Anthony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre (eds.), New Essays in Philosophical Theology, (London, SCM Press, 1955), pg. 149
[17] Ibid, pg. 151
[18] Alvin Plantinga, ‘The Free Will Defence’, in Basil Mitchell (ed.), Philosophy of Religion, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990), pg. 106
[19] Ibid, pg. 108
[20] Mackie, ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, pp. 33-4
[21] Flew, ‘Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom’, pp. 160-1
[22] Ibid, pg. 162
[23] Ibid, pg. 164
[24] Mackie, ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, pg. 32
[25] McCloskey, ‘God and Evil’, pg. 81
[26] William L. Rowe, ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism’, in Marilyn McCord Adams and R. Merrihew Adams (eds.), The Problem of Evil, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 129-30
[27] Ibid, pg. 130
[28] Ibid, pg. 131
[29] Keith E. Yandell, Philosophy of Religion: A Contemporary Introduction, (London, Routledge, 1999), pg. 132
[30] Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, pg. 28
[31] Ibid, pg. 27
[32] Terence Penelhum, ‘Divine Goodness and the Problem of Evil’, Religious Studies, 2, pg. 73
[33] Ibid, pg. 75
[34] Ibid, pg. 77
[35] Ibid, pg. 78
[36] Mackie, ‘Omnipotence and Evil’, pg. 34
[37] Plantinga, ‘The Free Will Defence’, pg. 110
[38] Ibid
[39] Ibid
[40] Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil, (Grand Rapids, Mich., Eerdmans, 1974), pg. 48
[41] McCloskey, ‘God and Evil’, pp. 81-2
[42] Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, pg. 34
[43] Ibid, pg. 35
[44] Ibid, pg. 34
[45] McCloskey, ‘God and Evil’, pg. 62
[46] Flew, ‘Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom’, pg. 146
[47] Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, pp. 32-3
[48] McCloskey, ‘God and Evil’, pg. 70
[49] Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, pp. 32-3
[50] McCloskey, ‘Evil and God’, pg. 71
[51] Mackie, ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, pg. 34
[52] Ibid, pg. 36
[53] Ibid.
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