Edwin Morgan - Glasgow Green

Glasgow Green

Clammy midnight, moonless mist.
A cigarette glows and fades on a cough.
Meth-men mutter on benches,
pawed by river Fog. Monteith Row
sweats coldly, crumbles, dies
slowly. All shadows are alive.
Somewhere a shout's forced out - 'No!' -
it leads to nothing but silence,
except the whisper of the grass
and the other whispers that fills the shadows.

'What d'ye mean see me again?
D'ye think I came here jist for that?
I'm no finished with you yet.
I can get the boys t'ye, they're no that faur away.
You wouldny like that eh? Look there's no two ways aboot it.
Christ but I'm gaun to have you Mac
if it takes all night, turn over you bastard
turn over, I'll -
Cut the scene.
Here there's no crying for help,
it must be acted out, again, again.

This is not a delicate nightmare
you carry to the point of fear
and wake from, it is life, the sweat
is real, the wrestling under a bush
is real, the dirty starless river
is the real Clyde, with a dishrag dawn
it rinse the horrors of the night
but cannot make them clean:
though washing blows
where the women watch
by day,
and children run,
on Glasgow Green.

And how shall these men live?
Providence, watch them go!
Watch them love, and watch them die!
How shall the race be served?
It shall be served by anguish
as well as by children at play.
It shall be served by loneliness
as well as family love.
It shall be served by hunter and hunted in the endless chain
as well as by those who turn back the sheets in peace.

The thorn in the flesh!
Providence water it!
Do you think it is not watered?
Do you think it is not planted?
Do you think there is not a seed of the thorn
as there is also a harvest of the thorn?
Man, take in that harvest!
Help that tree bear its fruit!
Water the wilderness, walk there, reclaim it!
Reclaim, regain, renew! Fill the barns and the vats!

Longing,
longing
shall find its wine.

Let the women sit in the Green
and rock their prams as the sheets
blow and whip in the sunlight.
But the beds of married love
are islands in the sea of desire.
It waves break here, in this park,
splashing the fresh as it trembles
like driftwood in the dark.

Are album's shuffling off the mortal coil?

I read this article today in the BBC News Magazine.

It's an interesting debate, which doesn't have a 'right' answer, but presents a ripe opportunity for me to comment.

Firstly I'm happy to admit that I download, a lot. It's convenient, fast, and cheap (or free depending on how legal you want to be). More than that, I can upload my MP3's to my iPod and have my whole music collection with me 24/7. That's a lot of music and a lot of choice.

That said, I also purchase and collect vinyl. When I'm in the house, I'll listen to vinyl rather than CD's or MP3's. Without going to much into it, it simply sounds better.

The main point however of the article above, is listening to an album, unedited, uninterupted and most importantly how the artist intended. The 'Record Clubs' believe that the culture of 'shuffling' or picking and choosing individual tracks from an album is contributing to the lost art of the album.

On one hand I completely agree. For most credible musicians, an album is surely the pinnicle of their creative output. And over the years certain artists have embraced this to an art form. Amongst others 'Darkside Of The Moon', 'Ziggy Stardust And The Spiders From Mars' and 'Kid A' come to mind as albums that need to be listened to in full. Certainly I enjoy listening to an album in full. It's good to hear songs in context and to hear more than just the singles that the record companies have deemed worthy of release.

However, anyone who knows me, knows I love to make playlists. I love hearing a song in amongst it's peers and musical influences. I love the juxtapostion of hearing Jeff Buckley next to Jay-Z next to Ella Fitzgerald. As I without musical talent myself, creating playlists is the nearest I get to creating something.

I certainly don't disagree with the dismantling of albums, even those classics. Even though it is 'art', once art is in the public domain, the artist no longer has complete ownership over it. People in the article have asked 'would you rearrange a Picasso?' The simple answer is we can do what ever we want with it, providing of course due credit is given to the original artist and we conform with legal copyrights. Music is constantly remixed, remastered, covered, sampled and shuffled. This is our right to do, firstly as creative people ourselves, but perhaps more importantly as the consumer.

Given all the above, I do really like the idea of listening to an album from start to finish, on a decent sound system, completely shut off from the world. In silent. I'll pick one and let you know how I get on.

Top 10 Albums of 2010

Not necessarily in any particular order, although I do try, here are my favourite albums of the last 12(ish) months. Needless to say, there's no Kings Of Leon... Oh well.

Feel free to agree/disagree/comment.

1. Grinderman - Grinderman 2

Everything dirty rock should be. No holds barred for Nick Cave, and this album truely is a relevation.

Check out - Worm Tamer

2. Arcade Fire - The Suburbs

They keep getting better and better. A perfectly crafted album that should warm the coldest of hearts.

Check out - Month Of May

3. Best Coast - Crazy For You

West coast stoner pop at it's finest. Granted I've never heard it at it's worst but still...

Check out - Feeling Of Love

4. Vampire Weekend - Contra

Lawsuits aside, this album picks up where 'Vampire Weekend' left off, and continues the party. Good times!

Check out - Cousins

5. LCD Soundsystem - This Is Happening

If this is the last thing James Murphy releases under the guise of LCD Soundsystem, then what a high to go out on.

Check out - Drunk Girls

6. Kele - The Boxer

Keeping alive the techno groove that Bloc Party strode into with 'Flux', Kele Okereke brings the beat with his solo offering.

Check out - On The Lam

7. Bombay Bicycle Club - Flaws

An all acoustic album that revels in the pop/folk genre.

Check out - Ivy & Gold

8. Frightened Rabbit - The Winter Of Mixed Drinks

Maybe not as powerful as earlier offerings, Frightened Rabbit's fourth album is however good enough to make my list.

Check out - Swim Until You Can't See Land

9. Admiral Fallow - Boots Met My Face

My discovery of 2010. Wonderful Scottish band, who make jolly good music. Buy it and listen.

Check out - Old Balloons

10. Belle & Sebastian - Write About Love

Twee indie kings return with an album to tug the heartstrings and brighten your day.

Check out - Write About Love

Enjoy!

"Today, the United Kingdom strives to be a modern and multicultural society. In this challenging enterprise, may it always maintain its respect for those traditional values and cultural expressions that more aggressive forms of secularism no longer value or even tolerate."

Pope Benedict XVI issued the above warning upon his arrival in Scotland today. A typical statement one may expect, but reading between the lines of his words, what does the Pope really mean?

The Pope advised followers:

"As we reflect on the sobering lessons of atheist extremism of the 20th century, let us never forget how the exclusion of God, religion and virtue from public life leads ultimately to a truncated vision of man and of society and thus a reductive vision of a person and his destiny."

And told Catholics:

"Do not be afraid to take up this service [Catholicsim] to your brothers and sisters, and to the future of your beloved nation."

The above quotes lead to me consider a few points. Estimates are the 70,000 people attended mass at Bellahouston today. The Pope asked the crowd to 'fight' for their beliefs. But my question is how many of that crowd share the beliefs the Pope wishes them to fight for.

This is a man who has stated that same sex marriages and abortion are the 'most insidious and dangerous challenges that today confront the common good.' The Catholic Church itselfs condemns homosexual acts as 'sinful', one leading Cardinal went as far to say homosexuals will never get into heaven.

On abortion he advises that it is necessary for the Church to make people aware of the 'intrinsic evil' of abortion and that it is 'an aggression against society itself' even for victims of rape.

Support for these two views has dwindled in society, even amongst many more 'liberal' Catholics. Yet the Pope and the Church he leads, hold their position, maintaining the 'truth' of a nearly 2000 year old book.

On contraception, namely condoms, again Benedict and his Church maintain a hardline stance. When questioned on the best way to tackle the AIDS/HIV epidemic griping Africa, the Pontiff esposes that ,"The traditional teaching of the church has proven to be the only failsafe way to prevent the spread of HIV/Aids."

Add to his holiness' list of 'thou shall nots' masterbation, sex outside of marriage, and indeed sex for a purpose other than procreation, I wonder just how many of the 70,000 fold are ready to 'fight' for their Catholic beliefs?

Now my views on religion aside, I find the blatant ignorance of Catholic teachings astondings. It is my belief that one should be free to belief what they like, so long as that belief does not harm others. So for all those Catholics who do believe to the letter of Catholic doctrine then, despite questioning their mentality, I can at least pay testament to their honesty.

But it is those Catholics, who are willing to take what the Holy See himself calls a 'pick and mix' attitude to their faith, that I cannot extend that same respect to. Clearly the liberal views of 21st century society are at an odds with the almost unchanged doctrines of the Catholic Church. Yet for a large majority of the folk, rather than challenge their faith or their desire to exist in the modern world, the easier route is to bury their heads and ignore the clash.

I've heard today's visit being described as an inspiration, bringing hope to the people, and renewing the people's faith. Yet it appears to me, that 21st century Catholics need not to 'fight' for their faith, but to firstly define what their 'faith' is.

One may respond that those who do masterbate, or have sex outwith marriage, or have had an abortion or are gay, are like all other sinners, and simply are trying to use the Church to guide them to a better life. To quote the Church, 'hate the sin, not the sinner'. But this is to grossly overlook the situation. The Catholic teaching on these matters, and many more which this blog has not touched upon are wildly out of date. Whilst I find other religions just as false or harmful as Catholicism, at least members of other faiths can self evalutate their beliefs, and split from the teaching of the Church should they need to.

Perhaps it grows from the indoctrination from an early age, statistics show the majority of adult Catholics were baptised and raise Catholic in Catholic schooling, or perhaps the policy of Papal Infabillity is to blame, but as a faith, Catholicism and the hypocrits that label themselves Catholic, need to have a purge of their beliefs to arrive at a less contradicting position.

I finish on a point suggested by the opening quotations of this blog. Pope Benedict XVI guards against secularism and atheism, arguing that only objective truths can provide stability and safety for human kind. It is worthwhile asking his holiness where exactly he obtains these truths from? A 2000 year old book, written by man? Is this not equally subjective? Has God himself spoken to Benedict and informed him of the 'truth'? If so are we to simply take the Pope at his world? And what of other religions and their objective truths? What provides Catholicism with any more justification than Buddhism, Islam or Hinduism, that it's 'truth' is the true 'truth'. The fact is that all truth in this world is completely subjective. Humanity decides what is right and what is wrong, what is good and what is bad. And that I fear is the one thing the Church cannot endorse, the people deciding for themselves.

As Friedrich Nietzche once said, "In Christianity neither morality nor religion come into contact with reality at any point." The Church bases it truths on how it would like the world to be, not infact how the world actually is.

Hume and the mind

In his most famous work, A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume outlined his account of the human mind. Central to this

Hume himself offered up the missing shade of blue as an exception to his account of the mind, which states that all ideas are formed from impressions. The example he claims provides at least one clear occasion where an idea can be formed without the relevant sensory experience.

The problem is this, directly quoted from Hume, Treatise,

"Suppose, therefore, a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly acquainted with colours of all kinds, except one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never has been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades of that colour, except that single one, be placed before him, descending gradually from the deepest to the lightest; it is plain, that he will perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, and will be sensible, that there is a greater distance in that place between the contiguous colours than in any other. Now I ask, whether it be possible for him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been conveyed to him by his senses? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can"

I was thinking about this, and it seems to me, that even if the man can form the concept of the missing shade of blue, it is not an example of an innate idea, or an idea not caused by an impression.

It is clear that the spectrum of colour is one that progresses along a set pattern. So each increasing shade of blue is one hue more than the previous. So all the set shades of blue that we can perceive could be represented as such:
BlueA, BlueA+1, BlueA+2, BlueA+3, etc...

So if we agree there is such a set pattern, then by perceiving all the shades of blue, bar one, we have perceived this pattern. And if we have perceived the pattern, (had an impression of it) then we can form an idea of the pattern.

So if we have an idea of the pattern that the shades of blue follow, then upon recollecting the shades we have experienced, we should be able to fill in the gap, that is to have an idea of the missing shade.

However this idea is not uncaused or without a relevant impression. Indeed the idea is a complex one formed from both the impression of the shades of blue we have encountered, and the impression of the pattern. So the idea is not one that is formed without the relevant sensory experience.

The best comparison I can make is to numbers. We may have never directly experienced 611 things, but we can form an idea of what 611 is, because we are familiar with the pattern that numbers follow.

Obviously if we did not have an idea of the pattern we could not fill in the missing shade, but to perceive the other shades of blue, is to perceive the pattern. It may not be strikingly obvious, but upon reflection the nature of the pattern should be revealed.

Dissertation

A few years back I handed in my dissertation for Honours Philosophy. My chosen area of study was the much debated 'Problem of Evil'.

Q. “Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then is he impotent? Is he able but not willing? Then is he malevolent? Is he both able and willing? Whence is he evil?”[1] Can the theist provide a satisfactory response to Philo’s problem?

In this dissertation I shall consider several proposed solutions to the problem of evil. I aim to establish how these solutions fail to reconcile the belief in the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and Omni benevolent God with the existence of evil. I will show that belief in a God of this sort is irrational, as it cannot be held unless the theist embraces logically contradictory claims. I shall examine two types of theodicy, and consider if either type can solve the theist's dilemma. I shall consider possible defences of the theist’s position and demonstrate how they fail. Once it has been shown that these two solutions to the problem of evil fail, I shall turn my attention to the claim that God is omnipotent. I will aim to establish that even if a rationally defensible theodicy could be found to resolve belief in the existence of God with evil, this theodicy would not be consistent with belief that God is omnipotent according to the interpretation of 'omnipotence' as outlined by Mackie.

When discussing the problem of evil, it is prudent to make clear certain claims. Firstly the claim that God is omnipotent, omniscient and Omni benevolent. If this claim is not held, the Philo need not pose his problem. Once we have accepted this, we must categorise what we mean by omnipotence, omniscience, and Omni benevolence. Omniscience is the least important of the terms and is usually incorporated into omnipotence. For our purposes its definition simply means that God knows everything.[2] Omni benevolence, as J. L. Mackie defines it, means that a benevolent thing opposes evil in as much as it can, so an Omni benevolent being will always oppose evil. Mackie defines omnipotence as the ability to do anything, which is logically conceivable. The problem of evil as Mackie defines it runs as follows,

1. God is omnipotent
2. God is Omni benevolent
3. Omnipotence means the ability to do anything which is logically conceivable
4. Omni benevolent means always opposing evil
5. Therefore God would not allow evil.
6. Evil exists
7. Therefore God, as defined in the premises, does not exist.[3]

Mackie concludes from his argument that given the truth of all the premises, God does not exist. It should be noted that by this, Mackie does not mean there cannot be a divine creator, simply that He cannot be both omnipotent and Omni benevolent. I shall aim to further strengthen Mackie’s conclusions during the course of this dissertation.

            Nelson Pike comments that Mackie’s argument is lacking a vital premise, namely that God would have no morally sufficient reason to permit evil.[4] Just as the pain of chemotherapy is permissible because it cures cancer, God may have a reason for permitting the evils that befall our world. If He does, then Philo’s problem is answered, for He is none of the suggestions. This can also be characterised as stating that Omni benevolence is always opposing the greatest evil, so the lesser evil is permitted if and only if it serves to prevent the greater evil. However, in accordance with our definition of omnipotence for God to have a sufficient reason to permit evil, it must be a logical impossibility for God to acquire whatever means are acquired by any other method. In short that God would have no morally sufficient reasons to permit evil must be a necessary truth.[5] We can identify two types of theodicy that may prove to be morally sufficient reasons for God’s allowance of evil. Firstly the protection of a future good that outweighs the evil permitted, and secondly the protection of a prior good that outweighs the evil permitted.[6] We shall examine these in turn to determine if either can indeed resolve the theist’s dilemma.

            Firstly, let us look at the suggestion that the protection of a future good would be a morally sufficient reason. As God is omniscient then He knows what effects certain acts will have. Hence if an evil act would promote a good act, or indeed many good acts, that is more valuable than the evil act, then He would be morally permitted to allow it. This means that permitting the evil to allow a better good is actually better than preventing the evil, and consequently the good. Compare this stance to our chemotherapy patient. Suppose in this scenario, we have exceptionally good reason to believe that with chemotherapy the patient’s cancer will be cured and that they will regain full health. We would class this as a greater future good. But we also know that the only way this future good is possible is through chemotherapy. So in order to obtain full health, we have to permit chemotherapy. However, as this is the only way to obtain the greater good it is permissible. This line of thinking is more commonly known as the theodicy that God permits evil as it allows goods which otherwise would not exist, hence the world is better with some evil in it than without.

            Mackie offers an evaluation of this theodicy, characterising it as such:

Pain and suffering are first order evils, and in contrast to these are pleasure and happiness, which are first order goods. First order evils allow the existence of sympathy, generosity, charity and other such goods, which are classed as second order goods. God permits first order evils because they allow second order goods.[7] Does this offer a morally permissible reason for God to allow evil? I do not think it does. Firstly it commits the theist to saying that second order goods are in fact better than first order goods. Certainly many theists do advocate that hedonist pleasure is not the greatest good, and there may be grounds to grant this. But happiness in the absence of evil, or love, both first order goods, seems to me to be better than second order goods. Herein lies the problem. The value of good in this case is subjective. The theist claims that second order goods are better whilst others may claim first order goods are better. If we could be sure of the objectivity of the value of goods then such a claim either way could be supported, however only God could tell us of this. If we could prove that second order goods are better, the theist then finds himself in a contradictory position. We either have a duty to limit first order evils or not. He cannot advocate the eradication of first order evils, pain and suffering, as this would dry up the availability of second order goods. In exorcising second order goods, we are actually making the world worse off. If we do have an obligation to limit the first order evils, then the original justification for them turns out to be false. H. J. McCloskey notes that the theist should in fact regret the progress of science and technology in alleviating the pain and suffering of the world, as they have reduced the possibility for many greater second order goods.[8]

            Mackie himself also outlines several reasons why this account of why God permits evil is implausible. Firstly, the theist has shifted the definition of what it is to be benevolent. Our original definition states a benevolent being will reduce evil as much as it can. However, if this theodicy is correct, then is God not trying to reduce first order evils, but trying to increase second order goods.[9] The theist is in a dilemma over what God is actually doing; decreasing first order evils, or increasing second order goods. The theist has to say He is increasing second order goods; otherwise his justification for evil falls apart. And this is not reducing evil as much as one can. The theist has changed the definition of God. Secondly, the theodicy creates an infinite regress. It should be clear that as first order evils give rise to second order goods, similarly first order goods will give rise to second order evils, such as cowardice, jealousy, ignorance, etc. In order for consistency, these second order evils have to be considered worse than the first order evils. So it now seems we should concern ourselves with limiting second order evils. This would be done through the existence of third order goods, which arise from second order evils. Third order goods again must be considered better than second order goods. It is clear that this leads to an infinite regress, which severely damages the account, as we can never be sure which goods we should be promoting.[10]

            It has been shown in the previous paragraphs that the suggestion of protecting a future good is not a morally sufficient reason for God to allow evils. We cannot say with any certainty that second order goods are to be preferred to first order goods. Even if we could, the theist must regard the elimination of first order evils as a bad thing, and this places him in a contradictory position. We have shown how the theist has changed the definition of God, so it no longer entails He is Omni benevolent. And we have seen that this theodicy leads inescapably to an infinite regress, rendering it unable to justify God’s allowance of evil.

            We now turn our attention to the second type of theodicy, that in allowing evils God is protecting a prior good. This prior good is free will. On this account, free will’s value must outweigh every actual and possible evil that has occurred or could occur, a statement, which is at first glance debatable. W. D. Niven asks, “Which is preferable – a grim fight with the possibility of splendid triumph; or no battle at all?”[11] Niven’s thoughts when applied to the issue of free will and evil present us with a choice between a world that contains free will and evil that can be overcome through a struggle or a world that contains no free will and no evil. The free will theodicy tells us that we should favour the first choice as a world with free will is better than one without, no matter how blissful that latter world may be. This seems to me an irrational position to take because in any case, surely the burden of proof is on the supporter of the free will defence to show why free will is to be valued so highly.[12]

However, whilst it is far from conclusive, many do regard free will as something of high, maybe even the highest, value. In light of this we shall reluctantly proceed as though the answer to Niven’s question is that a grim fight would be better than no battle at all. If we cast our minds back to our original definition of a morally sufficient reason, it has to be such that the good cannot be brought about in any other way. And when we consider that God, as we have defined him, is omnipotent, meaning He can do anything that is logically possible, we are then left to conclude that the only logically possible way to permit free will is to allow the occurrence of future evils caused by the abuse of it.

            Is this necessarily so however? Could God not have made humans so that they possess the capacity to freely choose evil, but that they never did so? History presents us with people who never acted wrongly. Jesus and Mother Teresa are two well-known examples, who lived completely moral lives. Now if we allow that both Jesus and Mother Teresa in fact did no wrong, are we to then say they were not free? For the free will defender the possibility that God could create free men who always choose good must be impossible, otherwise God could have brought about free will without evil, hence nullifying the justification of it. In addressing this issue, we must first determine whether complete moral goodness is possible in the absence of evil.

Ninian Smart states that if humans were wholly good, then the ascription of goodness would be unintelligible.[13] He claims that the term good, is connected with concepts such as courage, generosity and so forth. So that when we recognise X’s goodness we are recognising these concepts in them. He also claims that overcoming temptation is what makes acting in the right way commendable. So that a person who does a good act in the face of temptation is to be commended more than one who does it without such temptation.[14]

            Smart is advocating that without the existence of evils, the concept of wholly good beings is unintelligible. I feel that this view is mistaken. The distinction between different kinds of goods and evils is a purely human concept. We understand concepts such as courage and generosity because we can see their opposites, cowardice and selfishness. If however humans never showed examples of cowardice or selfishness, that would not mean that courage and generosity ceased to exist, simply that we could not identify them, because there would be no need for such a distinction. If all the acts of the world were ‘good’ as we understand it, then there wouldn’t be any need for the distinction between good and evil, but it would not detract from the fact that ‘good’ was still being done. Does a good act have to be recognised as such, for it to count as good? Smart seems to think so, but I would argue that a man could act in a way that was good, without knowing so. In response to the claim that a good act done in the face of temptation is better than one done without such temptation, I would argue this again is mistaken. Smart describes a Utopia where the inhabitants are never tempted nor desire to do.[15] He asks why we should call the inhabitants of this utopia good, as they do not display courage, or generosity, nor do they resist temptations. However their lack of courage and generosity is simply because such things are not required, due to the lack of evil. Again we are reverting back to the situation of second order goods, which has been shown to be inadequate.

Smart also claims that because the inhabitants do not resist the temptations to err, that they cannot be claimed to be good. Regardless of the motives, an act can still be good. For example, John is hungry. John notices an unguarded watermelon on the fruit stall and the thought of stealing it to satisfy his hunger crosses his mind. However John concludes that the negatives of stealing the watermelon far outweigh the positives and so he refrains from stealing it. Jim on the other hand is a watermelon fanatic, and upon seeing the watermelon is overcome by huge temptation to steal it. However Jim knows that stealing is wrong and so resists the great temptation. Both have done the exact same act, albeit with different motives, and levels of temptation.

Smart wants to say the second act is better than the first, however I do not believe it so. Both acts are the same, so both should be equally valued. In dealing with evil, we are dealing with the act, not the desires that motivate the act. If we were to take Smart’s stance then it would be plausible that evil acts caused by good motives would be good, or at least better than those acts caused by evil motives. This is akin to saying ‘X meant well’. While that might very well be true, it is the end result, the action, that is judged and that we are concerning ourselves with.

              So we have determined that a wholly good person is possible without the existence of evil. The question now is whether they can be both wholly good and free. Essentially what is at stake here is whether free will is compatible with determinism. If we believe that God causes us to act right, then do we have free will at all? I aim to show that acting consistently right is compatible with free will. We must first define what we mean by free will. Anthony Flew suggests that free will does not necessarily need to involve unpredictability or a lack of causation.[16] Indeed to be able to say that a person could have acted differently isn’t to say his actions were unpredictable or uncaused, it simply means there were other options open to him. Flew states that to say X could have helped doing something is to say that if X had chosen to act otherwise, he would have been able to. Flew believes that providing we act on causes from within our own nature, then we are free. Only when we act on causes from out with our own nature do we lose our free will, because we are being coerced. Flew believes we cannot be bound by our own nature as it is our own. If we accept causation, then every act will have a cause and effect. My freedom is not in being able to act uncaused, as this is impossible; it is in being able to choose which causes to act on. If we take a simple example, where only two possible actions exist, we can see where my free will comes to effect. I have the choice to type or not to type. No other action is possible here. Now clearly there will be causes for me to type, and causes for me to not type. However without me, as the free agent in the middle, nothing will become of these causes. I act on one or the other. The free will is my ability to choose. If I cannot choose, then I am not free. As Flew notes, positions such as this exist within theistic positions such as the Catholic doctrine that God’s foreknowledge covering all human behaviour is not incompatible with free will.[17] So it appears the theist is guilty of double standards.

            Can we then say that it is logically possible for God to have allowed free will without it entailing evil? Alvin Plantinga writes that ‘to create creatures capable of moral good, He must create creatures of moral evil; but He cannot create the possibility of moral evil and at the same time prohibit its actuality.’[18] Plantinga picks up on Flew’s point that the free will defender is not using the term free correctly. He claims that Flew’s objection is defused if we substitute the word ‘free’ with the word ‘unfettered’. Hence a world where unfettered humans do both good and bad is better than a world where fettered men do only good acts.[19] However I feel that Plantinga is missing the point. Determinism does not entail that humans are fettered into their actions. Causes are not something that binds a person to a particular action; it is inevitable that every action will have a cause. Causes give reasons for actions, but they themselves cannot motivate. It is important to note the distinction between a cause and a motive. Plantinga is implying that causal determinism means we are shackled by the causes of our actions, this however ignores that we choose which cause to act upon.

            Mackie raises an important point that if our actions are not caused by our character, then they are reduced to randomness.[20] If the theist’s account of free will is true then God is not responsible for evil. But can this account of random free will really be the greatest good such that we can justify God’s allowance of evil? Mackie would argue no, and I’m inclined to agree with him. The theist gives an inadequate account of what free will is.

            Defenders of the free will defence can be accused of equating determinism with predestination. In response to Flew’s suggestion that free will is compatible with determinism the theist may state that what Flew has shown is that there is no contradiction in the idea of men always freely being morally good although their behaviour followed the laws of nature and thus determined by those laws. He has not however shown that there is no contradiction in God arranging things so that all men would always freely be morally good.[21] The first instance describes causal determinism, which we have already shown to be compatible with free will. The second instance however refers to divine predestination. Predestination implies that whenever we act we have no choice in that action, it was already pre chosen. By making this distinction the theist is stating that the world is in fact predestined. For if it was not then it would be possible for God to create men so that they could always freely choose good as we have shown. And if this were possible then God would have no morally sufficient reason for allowing evil to protect human free will, as free will could be protected through other means. Flew compares the idea of predestination to being hypnotised by God, stating that the hypnotist can only be held responsible for the actions of his hypnotised victims if they did not consent to the hypnosis.[22] However clearly in the case of a creator God, this kind of escape from responsibility is not applicable. If God created us, already under the ‘spell’ of predestination, we could not consent to it. This implies that, if the world is predestined then human beings cannot be held responsible for their actions. Flew believes that predestination and free will are compatible.[23] As mentioned previously he believes that the meaning of ‘acting freely’ is that we act based on causes from within ourselves and without compulsion, not acting predictably or without cause. I would disagree with Flew’s definition of freedom, as there has to be some excursion of choice involved. However regardless of this Flew demonstrates that the theist cannot defend the free will defence by reverting to a predestined view of the world. If predestination is not compatible with free will then there is no free will, hence God has no morally sufficient reason for permitting evil. If predestination is compatible with free will, then it is not so that God could only protect free will by allowing evil, and again He has no morally sufficient reason to allow it.

            We have shown that free will is compatible with determinism, and that predestination is not a viable option for the theist. There is however another possible morally sufficient reason for God to allow evil. McCloskey examines the claim that goods made possible by free will justify evil. Here the claim is that free will, in itself is not the aim, but the goods that it allows, most importantly the triumph over evil. This avoids the problem of claiming that free will is to be desired above all things. However we still need to show that the allowance of evil is the only logical way to bring about these goods. Let us suppose that the theist succeeds in showing this, and that there is no other way the goods generated by free will could be achieved. There is still however no conclusive proof that this is a morally sufficient reason. Again the problem for the theist is showing that the goods made possible by free will are better than those not. Mackie’s objection still stands, all that has been changed is that free will is making possible some second order goods, rather than evil.[24] The position still reverts to an inescapable infinite regress.

As with the claim of greater goods being achieved by overcoming evils, it seems that we are being advised to seek out and overcome evils. This does not seem in line with human nature, which typically strives to avoid evil. Even if we grant that God makes great goods available to humans at the cost of some evil is a plausible reason; it is still reliant upon showing that the number of people who take advantage of the goods allowed by free will outweighs the amount of evil that occurs as a result of free will.[25] If more evil occurred then we would expect God to remove the free will, and conclude that it was a failed experiment. This is obviously impossible to show either way, and hence the theodicy can only provide at best a possible justification, not a certain justification.

            McCloskey notes it is essential to the problem of evil that every instance of evil is accounted for by a morally sufficient reason. Hence if we grant that the preservation of free will is a morally sufficient reason it has to account for every possible instance of evil to succeed. If we can establish one instance where free will does not account for the evil act, then the problem is still intact.

This entails that any given act of evil must have a point to it, namely that it protects free will. If it does not then we have established an instance where there is no morally sufficient reason for evil. William Rowe’s famous example of ‘Bambi’ serves this point well.[26] In Rowe’s example, Bambi is a fawn burned alive in a forest fire, whose suffering has no connections to any observed greater good, or prevention of a worse evil. Now, Rowe correctly notes that this in itself does not prove that there is an instance of evil, which has no morally sufficient reason, as we cannot show there are definitely no connections to the preservation of free will, because we lack omnipotence. However whilst we cannot conclusively prove that Bambi’s suffering is pointless, Rowe believes it is rational to believe it so.[27] In the case of the fawn, it seems rational to believe that there is no protection of free will, hence no morally sufficient reason. Rowe remarks that in light of our experiences, where we can imagine and encounter seemingly pointless evils, it seems absurd to think that every instance of suffering has a morally sufficient reason. Just as we rationally believe that the sun will rise each morning, we can rationally conclude that there are no morally sufficient reasons for God’s allowance of evil.[28]   

Keith Yandell responds that we cannot conclude that there is no morally sufficient reason for God’s allowance of evil. He responds to Rowe by stating that if we are to claim there exist apparently pointless evils, such as the case of ‘Bambi’, then it must be true that if an evil has a point, it will be apparent to us otherwise we could not confidently claim it to be pointless.[29] He claims that the purposes of God may be beyond our comprehension, and hence if God allows evils for a purpose, we may not be able to know what that purpose is. Now if we accept this we have to ask, why would God keep the reason a secret? If He were Omni benevolent, then surely telling us why He has permitted these great evils to befall us would be a good thing? For one, it would end much of the debate about His nature and existence. God can be accused of keeping us in a torture chamber, whilst assuring us that our presence there has a good reason, but that we would not understand that reason. Our definition of omnipotence states that God cannot do what is not logically possible; hence it must be that God’s morally sufficient reason is within the realms of logic. If this is the case, and indeed it must be, for if God could bend the rules of logic then the free will theodicy is defeated as He could create free men who always do right, then it must be possible for us to understand God’s reason as it is within the realms of logic. Even if we could not come to understand ourselves, we must still be able to comprehend it if it was fully explained to us. And God, being Omni benevolent would have no reason not to explain his reasons. This leads us to conclude that either there is no morally sufficient reason, or that God is not Omni benevolent.

The above criticism of the free will theodicy is that the reasons for evil being permitted are unknown to us and only to God. This puts us in the position of choosing between there being instances of evil which an omnipotent, omniscient and Omni benevolent being has a morally sufficient reason for allowing and there being instances of evil which an omnipotent, omniscient and Omni benevolent being has no morally sufficient reason for allowing. Without further evidence for either stance, I would argue that the latter is more likely. As Philo concludes in his discussion with Cleanthes and Demea, we cannot rationally conclude the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and Omni benevolent creator from the world we are faced with.[30]  Indeed Hume writes that the fact we know we cannot understand God’s reason does not make the argument more rational.[31]

While we have seen the problems the theist faces in reverting to a position of an unknown morally sufficient reason, this position is often held. Terence Penelhum notes that any theodicy offered would have to be compatible with God’s omnipotence, omniscience and Omni benevolence.[32] He asserts that when we label someone as morally good it is dependent upon his or her observed behaviour. If they act in a way that matches our own moral standards then we will label them good, if they do not, then we will not. In calling someone good, the standards they conform to must be the ones we hold ourselves, although we do not necessarily have to display them. The same applies to God.[33] A similar principle applies in regards to moral authorities. If I accept someone, for instance the Pope, as an authority figure on moral matters, then when he makes moral decisions, I must adjust my own beliefs in accordance with this. Otherwise I will have contradictory beliefs, i.e. that the Pope is someone whose decisions should be followed but that this particular decision is wrong.[34] Similarly inconsistencies would arise if a moral decision made by God did not hold with the moral principles the theist held previously.[35] So what ever morally sufficient reason God could have for permitting evil, has to be in accordance with the theists own moral codes, in order to avoid contradiction.

This is why, Penelhum argues, that agnosticism regarding God having a morally sufficient reason for evil is not a viable position. For if no morally sufficient reason can be found within a system of beliefs, for instance Christianity, and yet that set of beliefs is consistent with the moral authority, God, then it must be that there is no morally sufficient reason, as that system is adopted from God. The theist is faced with two possibilities, either there is no morally sufficient reason for evil, which entails God cannot consistently be omnipotent, omniscient and Omni benevolent, or they can admit that the system of beliefs is wrong.

The free will defence is not capable of answering the problem of evil without contradiction. We have seen how the theist cannot claim that God could not bring about a world where men freely always chose good without reverting to a position of predestination, which is not a viable position. We have seen how it is rational to believe that there are instances of pointless suffering, and that if there were a reason, an Omni benevolent God would share it with us. We have seen how the theist cannot remain agnostic about God’s morally sufficient reason without either admitting God is wrong, or that their system of beliefs is wrong. One further contradiction arises when we consider the claim that deliberately not intervening to stop an act of evil is itself morally wrong. If this claim is correct, and indeed it is emphasised in many religious traditions, then an omniscient God would be a bystander on every occasion where an act of evil was committed and so it would be not only right for him to intervene, but a moral obligation. As evil acts are present in the world, we can conclude that God does not completely intervene on these occasions, although it is possible there are occasions where He does. By completely intervene I mean such that the evil is completely eliminated. It may be possible that God does try to stop evil, and succeeds in making them better than they would have been without His intervention, but on this view we would have to conclude that God cannot be omnipotent, as He cannot completely intervene. As we have seen already an Omni benevolent God would require a morally sufficient reason to not intervene, and this reason is the protection of free will. But this raises the dilemma of which person’s free will is to be protected. Should God protect the free will of the rapist over the free will of the rape victim? If we state that both should be protected then the theist cannot claim it is right to intervene to prevent evil acts. By doing nothing God protects free will, but we must conclude He is either not Omni benevolent as He doesn’t always wish to intervene, which we have already stated is better, or that He is not omnipotent and cannot completely intervene.

Another contradiction that the free will argument entails is that God’s refusal to intervene on occasions of evil must entail that a wrong free act is better than a right un-free act.[36] However this goes against what is said about sin in other contexts, for if any free act is good, then how can free sin be wrong? If the freedom to do what is wrong is good, then how can acting on that freedom be seen as bad? Sin could be wrong in regards to other good free acts, but it cannot be regarded as the greatest evil, for that must be a lack of freedom.

The free will theodicy, despite the problems it faces, remains a popular response to the problem of evil. In this next section we shall examine a defence of the free will theodicy. By claiming that God is omnipotent, it follows that God can create any logically possible state of affairs. Plantinga argues that if this is true then it entails the truth of the following; that there are men who are not created by God is a logically possible state of affairs. And this in turn entails; If God is omnipotent then he can create men not created by him.[37] Now it seems to me that Plantinga’s first claim, if true, would mean that the theist’s claim that God created the universe, thus everything in it, would be false. If God is to be described as an omnipotent creator, or the ‘first cause’, then it seems that the existence of men who are not created by God is not logically possible. However if we grant that it is a logically possible state of affairs then Plantinga argues that the claim that God can create any state of affairs needs to be amended such that God can create any state of affairs (S) such that God creates (S) is consistent.[38] He then claims that when this is taken with the claim that all men could always freely choose good is a logically possible state of affair, it does not entail that God can create free men who always choose good. This can only be true if God creates men who always freely choose good is consistent.[39] He then equates this statement with the claim that God creates free men and brings about that they always freely choose good. Again Plantinga is guilty of confusing determinism with predestination, and hence fails in his objection.

Plantinga’s famous defence of the free will concerns transworld depravity. He claims that for any action (A) that a person (P) will have to make a moral choice about there is a possible situation (S) where P will choose wrongly in regards to A. Possible situations in this context refer to possible worlds. Plantinga writes, “If S were actual P would go wrong with respect to A.”[40] What this entails is that if God chose to create some world (W) where (P) did no wrong, then (S) would occur in the actual world and (P) would go wrong with respect to (A). And then it would turn out that God didn't create (W) after all, because (P) does no moral wrong in (W). Plantinga claims that it is at least possible that everybody suffers from transworld depravity and if that is the case, then it will not be possible for him to bring about a world with moral good, but no moral evil. Important to Plantinga’s theory is not the truth of this claim, but merely the possibility of it. It deals with the necessity of the claim ‘God could have made men such that they always freely choose good’. If the free will defence is to be shown false, then this claim has to be necessarily true. However what Plantinga has shown is that it is possible that it is not true, so it cannot be necessarily true. Plantinga, has been credited with solving the logical problem of evil, however he does not solve the evidential problem.

Whilst this solution is possible, it is by no means clear that it is actual, and certainly it is not rational that we should accept it as such. However we shall proceed as though the free will defence does provide a morally sufficient reason for God to allow evil. What I aim to show is that free will is incompatible with omnipotence, omniscience and Omni benevolence, and that even if the free will defence succeeds in answering the problem of evil, it still entails that God is not as initially defined by Mackie.

Now if we consider the free will defence as true, and that evil is a result of human free choice, then we must conclude that God knows that giving humans free will, will incur some evil. So He knows that some of the people He creates will in fact live a life of sin, and never experience the goods made possible by free will, or be worthy of salvation. Now the question is if God knows this to be true, then why would He create these people, knowing full well that they will be condemned to a life of misery and then an eternal damnation in Hell?[41]

Consider this analogy; overcoming an addiction, such as cigarettes, may be considered a moral good. Now a morally motivated tobacco company decides they want to increase this good, and so release a highly addictive new cigarette, dubbed a ‘superette’. They know that many people will not have the will power, or mental aptitude to quit, and will become fatally addicted. However some people will quit and experience the good that this brings. Now imagine that the ‘superette’ was not a choice, but enforced on everyone at birth. We can equate Gods ‘gift’ of free will to the imposed ‘superette’. We did not ask for it, but yet are punished for misusing it; similarly we did not ask to be addicted but are punished for not overcoming it. God puts the temptation to do wrong in front of billions of people, fully aware that most of them will succumb to it.  Now it might be suggested that God cannot know which persons will turn out evil, as that choice is down to the individual person. This claim however seems to contradict God’s omniscience, as there are now things God does not know. And as previously mentioned certain theistic positions claim that God has foreknowledge over all human actions. Even if it is not, it remains however that if God cannot guarantee the creation of completely moral free creatures, which as Plantinga argues He cannot, then if He is Omni benevolent He should refrain from creation altogether as if there are no human beings, then not granting them free will cannot be an evil. Free will can only be the greatest good if there is someone to exercise it. So if the theist regards life as the greatest good, then the free will defence fails, as it would be better to have any life, free or un-free, than no life at all. As life does exist we can conclude that God is not Omni benevolent, and rather is much like Hume characterises Him ‘… [God] has no more regard to good above ill than to heat above cold, or to drought above moisture, or to light above heavy.’[42]

Hume believes that we cannot prove a conclusion of unmixed phenomena, from evidence of mixed phenomena.[43] By this he means that we cannot infer the existence of an Omni benevolent, or Omni malevolent God because the world contains both properties. This leaves the possibility of God being both good and evil, although Hume believes that the uniformity and steadiness of general law seems to oppose this stance, as God could not be both together.[44] Hence it is probable, Hume believes, that if God does exist then He would possess neither benevolence, nor malevolence.

The failings of the free will theodicy have been exposed, along with the contradictions its truth would entail. We have examined a possible defence of the theodicy and concluded that while it might resolve the logical problem; it does not resolve the evidential problem. We have also shown that even if the free will theodicy does provide a morally sufficient reason for God’s allowance of evil, it is incompatible with an omniscient, omnipotent and Omni benevolent creator, and one of these qualities must be abandoned, most likely Omni benevolence. However as McCloskey notes, much of these objections give too much credit to the free will defender.[45] We shall now examine perhaps a more obvious objection to the free will theodicy.

This objection regards the distinction between natural and moral evil. If the free will defence is true then we have a morally sufficient reason for evil providing that it protects human free will. But as Flew points out, not all evil in the world can be traced back to an origin in human wickedness caused by the misuse of free will.[46] The occurrence of natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis and hurricanes are not the result of human free will. Neither are diseases such as AIDS, cancer and influenza. Indeed the presence of these things leads Philo to comment, ‘One would imagine that this grand production had not received the last hand of the maker.’[47]

Now clearly as before, God needs to have a morally sufficient reason for permitting these natural evils. I shall examine two of the more popular reasons given. Firstly, that the natural laws which govern the planet are responsible for evil. This explanation would mean that earthquakes are simply a regrettable side effect of the earth’s tectonic plates moving; similarly hurricanes are a side effect of the need for global winds. However, this explanation is far from sufficient. Firstly it does not cover all natural evils, as there seems to be no need for diseases under natural law.[48] And Hume notes that even natural functions of the earth, such as rain and wind, do not have to turn into disasters such as monsoons and hurricanes. These functions may be necessarily but very often they fail to do what they were designed for.[49] And more importantly the theist offers no explanation why God could not intervene on occasions of natural evil, as it would not limit any free will, nor would it go against natural law, as He would merely be preventing the effects from reaching us. It could be stated that His intervention would go against the existence of natural laws and would devalue them, but surely this is the lesser of two evils. It seems that God’s policy of non-intervention is either down to his lack of omnipotence, or lack of Omni benevolence.

            A similar explanation to the problem of moral evil is also offered in regards to the problem of natural evil. The claim is that natural evil increases the total good by allowing charity, bravery, sympathy, etc. This is comparable to the claim that second order goods are better than first order goods. McCloskey raises several objections to this stance.[50] Firstly, that it does not set a limit on what the desirable level of evil is hence we cannot know which evils are justified and which are not. Secondly, if natural evil is means to a greater good; i.e. disease as a means to charity, sympathy, and so forth; then what of occasions where this good goes un-actualised. Is the possibility of moral good coming out of natural evil justification for it? This kind of justification would seem to be very weak, especially considering God’s omniscience would mean He would know which natural evils would be capitalised upon. Thirdly, stating that because a greater good follows a natural evil does not imply that the natural evil caused the greater good. It is invalid logic and needs more proof from the theist that this is indeed the case.

So now we have shown that the free will theodicy breaks down on several objections we shall turn our attention to a fatal blow to God’s omnipotence; the Paradox of Omnipotence. Mackie revisits this age-old dilemma by asking if an omnipotent being can create beings, which it cannot subsequently control, or create laws, which subsequently bind it.[51] So if God can creates men with free will, then He can no longer be omnipotent, and if He can’t create men with free will, then providing it is not a logically impossibility, He cannot be omnipotent. Now clearly the free will defender has to admit that creating men with free will is a logical possibility, otherwise the defence would be absurd. So if God can create men with free will, and does so, then He can no longer be omnipotent. This is reliant on the claim that to possess free will is to be free from forced action by a third party. So if God were to control us, we would not have free will, and again the free will theodicy would fail to provide a morally sufficient reason for evil. The paradox shows us that the traditional definition of God’s omnipotence cannot be meaningfully attributed to God. Clearly it is not true that God can do anything that is logically possible and remain omnipotent.

We can distinguish between two types of omnipotence; firstly the unlimited power to act, and secondly the unlimited power to determine what powers to act things shall have; O.1 and O.2 respectively.[52] What we can conclude is that God cannot continuously possess O.1 for if we claim God to have O.1, and then the paradox arises. However if God has O.1 and O.2 simultaneously then we avoid the paradox. This is because God can use O.2 to assign independent powers, such as human free will, but it limits His own power, meaning He does not have O.1 anymore but still retains O.2.[53] To Mackie at least the problem of evil is resolved by denying God’s omnipotence.

If we return to Philo’s original problem, then we have seen that the theist cannot provide a satisfactory response. In the course of this dissertation we have assessed two types of theodicy offered in response to the problem of evil. The first was the protection of a future good, which was shown to be implausible due to the subjectivity of the claims and the inevitable retreat to an infinite regress. Secondly was the protection of a prior good. Here we examined the ‘free will defence’ in great detail, showing how the theist must offer conclusive reasons why free will is to be valued above all. I have shown that the free will theodicy can only at best provide possible justification, and that despite this it is still irrational to believe in an omnipotent, omniscient and Omni benevolent God. Finally we addressed the claim that God is omnipotent. We have seen that the theist must address his definition of omnipotence, as it results in a paradoxical state. If we admit that God cannot be omnipotent, in the sense traditionally described, then we can resolve the problem of evil.

---

[1] David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, part X, pp. 22-3

[2] Although omniscience does become important when we discuss God’s knowledge that free will would lead to evil, which we shall discuss below.

[3] J. L. Mackie, ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, Mind, Vol. LXIV, No. 254, pg. 26

[4] Nelson Pike, ‘Hume on Evil’, The Philosophical Review, No. 72, pg. 41

[5] Ibid, pg. 42

[6] Ibid, pg. 43

[7] Mackie, ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, pg. 31

[8] H. J. McCloskey, ‘God and Evil’, Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. X, No. 39, pg. 75

[9] Mackie, ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, pg. 31

[10] Ibid, pg. 32

[11] W. D. Niven, ‘Good and Evil’, quoted in McCloskey, ‘God and Evil’, pg. 73

[12] Free will as the ultimate good raises further problems for the theist, which shall be addressed below. In regards to free will being better than no free will, it is possible that the illusion of free will could be a desired position, so long as it could be guaranteed that the illusion would not be shattered. So God could provide the illusion of free will, and prevent evil.

[13] Ninian Smart, ‘Omnipotence, Evil and Supermen’, in Nelson Pike (ed.), God and Evil: Readings on the Theological Problem of Evil, (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1964), pg. 106

[14] Ibid, pg. 105

[15] Ibid, pg. 108

[16] Anthony Flew, ‘Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom’, in Anthony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre (eds.), New Essays in Philosophical Theology, (London, SCM Press, 1955), pg. 149

[17] Ibid, pg. 151

[18] Alvin Plantinga, ‘The Free Will Defence’, in Basil Mitchell (ed.), Philosophy of Religion, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990), pg. 106

[19] Ibid, pg. 108

[20] Mackie, ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, pp. 33-4

[21] Flew, ‘Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom’, pp. 160-1

[22] Ibid, pg. 162

[23] Ibid, pg. 164

[24] Mackie, ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, pg. 32

[25] McCloskey, ‘God and Evil’, pg. 81

[26] William L. Rowe, ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism’, in Marilyn McCord Adams and R. Merrihew Adams (eds.), The Problem of Evil, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 129-30

[27] Ibid, pg. 130

[28] Ibid, pg. 131

[29] Keith E. Yandell, Philosophy of Religion: A Contemporary Introduction, (London, Routledge, 1999), pg. 132

[30] Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, pg. 28

[31] Ibid, pg. 27

[32] Terence Penelhum, ‘Divine Goodness and the Problem of Evil’, Religious Studies, 2, pg. 73

[33] Ibid, pg. 75

[34] Ibid, pg. 77

[35] Ibid, pg. 78

[36] Mackie, ‘Omnipotence and Evil’, pg. 34

[37] Plantinga, ‘The Free Will Defence’, pg. 110

[38] Ibid

[39] Ibid

[40] Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil, (Grand Rapids, Mich., Eerdmans, 1974), pg. 48

[41] McCloskey, ‘God and Evil’, pp. 81-2

[42] Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, pg. 34

[43] Ibid, pg. 35

[44] Ibid, pg. 34

[45] McCloskey, ‘God and Evil’, pg. 62

[46] Flew, ‘Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom’, pg. 146

[47] Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, pp. 32-3

[48] McCloskey, ‘God and Evil’, pg. 70

[49] Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, pp. 32-3

[50] McCloskey, ‘Evil and God’, pg. 71

[51] Mackie, ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, pg. 34

[52] Ibid, pg. 36

[53] Ibid.

WWII & Racism

So I'm looking through my old university essays and I've decided to post some on the internet. Who knows, it might prove I do talk sense sometimes... Enjoy.

Q. In what ways, and with what outcomes, did racism affect the planning and running of economies during World War II?

            A country’s wartime economy is an intensely complex entity. Considerations of armaments, provisions, and recruitment have to be factored in alongside the standards of life that civilian population expect. Trade factors and political commitments to allies weigh in on the economy also. German economists in the years 1939-1945 had the tremendously difficult job of keeping the country’s war machine running, and keeping its civilian population content and productive. Undoubtedly this was a tall order, but when we examine the uniqueness of the Third Reich, and account for the racial ideology, which existed at the very heart of National Socialism, it almost becomes impossible to embrace the advancement of both. As Adam Tooze writes,

“The demands of the war economy were paramount but they had to be reconciled with the requirements of ideology.”[1]

It is without any doubt that we can say that Hitler and his ministers main aim was to create a racially pure Greater Germany, based on ideas of the superior Aryan race, this being inclusive of Lebensraum expansion to the east. This is evident from early Nazi doctrines and legislations right up till the final statements in Nuremberg. What we have to answer is how far were the government willing to reserve their stance on treatment of these ‘racial impure’ persons in order to further the long-term goal of a racial pure society? Obviously Germany would need to win the war to realise its goal, but without help to its struggling economy this would never happen. I aim show that deep-seated racial ideology, which the Nazis encouraged from their inception, could not be overturned quickly enough to benefit the German economy when it needed it most.

In his essay, “Rational Means and Irrational Ends: Thoughts on the Technology of Racism in the Third Reich”, Beyerchen talks of the ‘technology of racism’. He defines this as technology, which exhausts all human possibilities by treating them purely as resources and not humans.[2] This definition without doubt applies to the treatment of slave and less than slave labourers in the Third Reich. Racism in practice in Germany, in Beyerchen’s description, is a combination of slavery and bureaucracy. It is where we frame ideas of humans in a biological manner, and create hierarchies and exclusions. This ultimately endorses a move to slave labour as it can be justified in terms of the predetermined hierarchies. When we combine this with the endeavour for efficiency, the result is ultimately corpses.[3]

            It is important to remember that Nazi policy began five years before the outbreak of war in Europe. It didn’t require much effort after 1939 to put into place the actions that led to the ‘final solution’ because of this groundwork that had been laid down from April 1933 to September 1939. Key legislations are the banning of Jews from key jobs in Germany, which was expanded gradually to include all but the lowest jobs. The Nuremberg laws effectively branded Jews second-class citizens, and in April 1939, forced ghettoisation began, with curfews to follow. The Jews were discriminated against, de-humanized, isolated, and eliminated from society.[4] This hatred for the Jews was installed into the SS, the Gestapo, the SA and all other Nazi agencies. They were encouraged and often rewarded for displaying these tendencies, so it should come as no great surprise that they were reluctant to give them up, as we shall see later. These pre-war racial policies were largely economically beneficial to Germany. The removal of Jews from the workplace saw the creation of many jobs for unemployed German workers. The forced seizure of Jewish assets gave the Nazi war fund a huge boost. And the forced emigration of vast numbers of Jews meant less of a population for the economy to deal with. Perhaps the only downside, from a National Socialist view, is the loss of several thousand technicians, scientists and other skilled workers.

            Nazi ideology tells us that any race other than the Aryan, especially Jews and Slavs, were to be regarded as inferior. So what was to become of these peoples? We know ultimately what did happen, but was this the goal from the start? Effectively, yes. As Michael Thad Allen points out, pre 1942 concentration camps were predominantly to dehumanise prisoners.[5] Meaningless tasks such as digging trenches only for the dug up dirt to be tipped back in back up this claim. Work was an effective form of keeping prisoners busy, and keeping them subdued. The Kommandant, under the command of Eicke, used labour to crush the will of concentration camp inmates, and display to them the might of National Socialism. In fact, actually production took so much of a second place to demoralisation in these early years, that prisoners who worked hard but still kept high spirits were treated worse than those who were unproductive but broken.[6] In the early years of the war 1939-1941, racial policies meant that Jews, Poles, Slavs, Gypsies and other lesser races usually ended up in concentration camps or ghettos. They were not alone in the camps; political prisoners, Prisoners of War and foreign civilians joined them. However concentration camp inmates numbered at only 60,000 peoples in early 1941.[7] If we discount the Poles that resided in Polish ghettos under the supervision of the SS from 1940 onwards, it still appears that concentration camp numbers seem low, given how many peoples of lesser race came under Nazi control. What we can infer is that many never made it to the camps, or never lasted long. Either shot on capture or so badly lacking malnutrition that death came quickly. From their inception, the Kommandant were directly responsible for overseeing concentration camp labour. This was an excuse to put into practice the racial ideology that National Socialism demanded of them. As stated above production was second to dehumanisation and hence levels of actually production were extremely low.[8]  If exploitation of racially impure persons for the benefit of the German economy in the early years of the war, then it was very poorly carried out. Given Nazi efficiency in most other aspects of society this seems unlikely. A more plausible scenario is that pre 1942 concentration camps were neither explicitly death camps, as witness in the dying days of the war, nor were they work camps as seen after 1942. They severed a purpose and that purpose was mainly to keep undesirables out of the way, work and death were merely things that happened.

            Spoerer and Fleischhacker in their essay, “Forced Labourers in Nazi Germany: Categories, Numbers and Survivors”, examine the phenomenon of foreign labour in the Third Reich. They break down foreign labourers into four distinct categories. Unsurprisingly these categories assume a ranking scale based on the Nazi scale of racial purity. At the top were privileged labourers, who were mostly workers from German allies, i.e. Italians, who could voice opinions and leave when they liked. Secondly were forced labours, who were from Western territories, and could voice opinions but could not leave. Thirdly were slave labours, most notably Slavic peoples, who had no voice and could not leave. And lastly were what Spoerer and Fleischhacker label less than slave labourers who had no rights, no privileges and no way out. This category was almost exclusively reserved for Jews and Soviet POWs.[9] It is estimated that around ten to fifteen million foreign workers contributed to the German economy during World War Two.[10] Spoerer and Fleischhacker state that,

“Only the German economy’s urgent need of man-power retarded their [Jews and Gypsies] immediate and complete destruction.”[11]

However, this by no means illustrates that racism did not affect the lives of foreign workers, particularly slaves and less than slaves. Death rates of forced labours compared with that of German workers show the effect of the deplorable work conditions foreigners faced. Westerners faced a death rate twice that of the German, and Eastern workers had a death rate six to seven times the German rate. And less than slave labourers had a death rate as high as three figures per thousand. [12] These figures stress the racial attitudes present within the German breakdown, and provisions for, labour forces.

            By 1942, it was clear that German resources were stretched. Armaments were in short supply and soldiers to use them were also in short supply. It is around this time that Nazi ministers saw the need to utilise the full economic value of concentration camps. Himmler instructed Pohl to convert his concentration camps into labour camps to be used for armaments. This required not only structural change but ideological change. As I have gone to great lengths to show, the prevailing attitude towards inmates was one of contempt and a policy of brutality prevailed. The Kommandant effectively saw this command as an undermining of these.[13] Mortality rates as high as 8-11% per month were no longer acceptable from an economic stance. The ultimate goal of Pohl’s revamped concentration camp was productivity not death. He believed that unnecessary beating, constant interruptions, and severe malnutrition were detrimental to this aim. This does not mean that he lacked any of the traditional Nazi traits, indeed he felt that discipline, force and control were all necessary to keep production high. But initially there was little success, the low production rates and lack of administration had become standard and nothing was seen wrong by those at the bottom.[14] A further overhaul of the system came later in 1942, when Maurer was appointed head of the WVHA and in control of concentration camp inmates. He was fully committed to the effectiveness of concentration camps and raised rates of production. He installed better means of administration and categorised inmates in a more sensible manner. Inmates were now categorised in accordance with their medical condition, and ability to work. Maurer also stressed the importance of camp doctors to keep stock of inmates at a healthy level.[15] However despite these changes racism and eugenics still persisted in everyday life. In categorising inmates, those of lesser races would automatically be branded unfit for work, despite their physical condition. Those who died due to work were given the cause of death as ‘poor human material’. This meant no reviews of conditions ever got carried out, as the deaths of inmates were accepted based on these racial views. The culture of racism existed in camps and prisoners were merely used as tools of production and when their use was done they were disposed of.[16]

            An explicit part of Hitler’s ultimate goal for Germany involved a policy of Lebensraum. This ‘living space’ was to be gained to the east, at the expense of the vast majority of the native populations, 80-85% in Poland, 64% in Ukraine and 75% in Soviet Russia. Only those capable of work were of any real use to Germany.[17] However what Himmler, and the SS soon realised was that in order to take full advantage of newly acquired lands, they would need people to build and work the infrastructures needed. This is where the German strategy, Generalplan Ost was intended to operate. Konrad Meyer in July 1941 suggested the use of Polish slave labour to begin construction programmes for the benefit of Germany. This was reinforced by Himmler, who in 1942 stated,

“if we do not fill our camps with [worker] slaves… who will build our cities, our villages,…”[18]

The total slave labourers needed for Generalplan Ost was to be a minimum of 175,000, comprised of Jews, Slavs and Soviet POWs. This would result in an estimated saving of 40% in labour costs.[19] These savings are similar to others right across Germany where slave labour was used. And so began the instrumentalisation of concentration camps as sources of slave labour. Implicit in this plan was the death of hundreds of thousands through ‘natural wastage’. The industrialised system of concentration camps became one of the largest economic enterprises in Germany, claims Beyerchen.[20] Auschwitz was turned into a combination of industrialised slave labour through I G Farben chemical plant and an industrialised death camp. Life expectancy for an inmate at Auschwitz was three to four months.[21] By 1944 demand for labour was so high that the SS could no longer afford to pick and choose workers based on racial status. It was at this stage that the majority of slave labour was directed towards munitions and weapons. Newly arriving concentration camp inmates were sent straight to work in factories, and remained there until the death marches of late 1944, early 1945.[22]

            Towards the end of the war there was a desperate struggle for survival in Germany. This is most notably seen in the development and proposals for so-called ‘wonder weapons’, which would help turn the war around. There was a determination of the German military to persist and prevail, at the expense of who ever got in the way. These military projects for development of weapons, echoed National Socialist ideology, in that it was the ‘racial inferior’ slaves who were to construct them.[23] Albrecht reminds us that the National Socialist technology that came out of the period 1941-1945 has to be judged not just by what it was, but also by how it was produced. As he writes,

“The sole distinctly National Socialist feature in the missile programme was the widespread use of concentration camp slave labour.”[24]

One such project that was oversaw by Kammler, was the construction of the V2 rocket, in underground facilities. Here there is some evidence of economic considerations being applied. Skilled slave workers were generally treated better, due to their essential nature to the project. Unskilled workers were generally worked to exhaustion.[25]

            Another important aspect that racism affected in relation to the German economy was the supply of food. After being starved to defeat in 1918, the Nazis were determined not to allow this to happen again. German plans for the conquest of the USSR involved the starvation of millions of native Slavs and Jews. The food supplies were to be redirected for use in Germany.[26] Even when prisoners were used as slave labour their food rations were fatally low so as to free more food for the German peoples. Jewish prisoners in the USSR received only 420 calories a day.[27] It is in this aspect that the German economy gained from purely racist actions. Had no racial ideology existed, then slave labourers would have received more food, at a greater cost to the German food supplies.

            We have looked at how the Third Reich implemented the Nazi regimes racist ideologies and what the outcomes of these were. We have shown that racial hierarchies provided justification for millions of peoples to be put to work as slaves. We have seen how these same hierarchies justified diverting food to more deserving people. We have shown how technology was advanced by means of disposable slave labour. Certainly the Nazis combined mass production with serial destruction of life.[28] The outcomes of these policies speak for themselves. Concentration camp inmates, working Jews and less than slave labourers had survival rates of approximately 31%, 55% and 41% respectively. When we compare this with the survival rates of POWs, and forced labourers, 70% and 98% respectively, we can see a clear distinction between economic exploitation and ideologically motivated genocide.[29] If we overlook those killed purely on racial grounds, we still find that that 2.5 million Jews, Soviet POWs and other lesser races died as a direct result of ‘death through work’[30] If we were to look at this in a cold and calculated manner, as did top SS officers from 1942 onwards, we have to conclude that the work camps and concentration camps were a catastrophic waste of labour resources. The years 1939 to 1945 are full of contradictions, but none seems so clear that the fact that German industry desperately needed masses of workers but the SS and Wehrmacht were purposely killing millions of fit and healthy workers. The Third Reich could not apparently resolve its economic needs with its racial ideology.[31]

            To go back to our original aim, I believe I have shown that Nazi racial ideology could not be overthrown simply because economic needs demanded so. In fact no more is the deep-seated racial hatred evident that in the fact that even after Himmler ordered a stop to the mass killings, they still continued right to the very end.[32]  As Tooze observes, too much had been vested in the creation of a racially pure society for it to be abandoned, even temporarily.[33] It seems as though two levels of Nazi thinking towards concentration camps existed. Top levels wanted productivity maxed with annihilation the consequence, whilst low-level SS men wanted annihilation with work as the means.[34] Whatever the aims, the results were the same, corpses. The effects to the German economy, ultimately, irrelevant.

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[1] Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, pg. 528

[2] Alan Beyerchen, “Rational Means and Irrational Ends: Thoughts on the Technology of Racism in the Third Reich”, Central European History 30, pg. 395

[3] Beyerchen, “Rational Means and Irrational Ends: Thoughts on the Technology of Racism in the Third Reich”, pp. 396-397

[4] Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wipperman, The Racial State: Germany 1933-1945, pg. 96

[5] Michael Thad Allen, “The Banality of Evil Reconsidered: SS Mid-Level Managers of Extermination through Work”, Central European History 30, pg. 261

[6] Allen, “The Banality of Evil Reconsidered: SS Mid-Level Managers of Extermination through Work”, pg. 265

[7] Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, pg. 473

[8] Allen, “The Banality of Evil Reconsidered: SS Mid-Level Managers of Extermination through Work”, pg. 266

[9] Mark Spoerer and Jochen Fleischhacker, “Forced Labourers in Nazi Germany: Categories, Numbers and Survivors”, Journal of Interdisciplinary History 33, pg. 174

[10] Spoerer and Fleischhacker, “Forced Labourers in Nazi Germany: Categories, Numbers and Survivors”, pg. 171

[11] Spoerer and Fleischhacker, “Forced Labourers in Nazi Germany: Categories, Numbers and Survivors”, pg. 171

[12] Spoerer and Fleischhacker, “Forced Labourers in Nazi Germany: Categories, Numbers and Survivors”, pg. 184

[13] Allen, “The Banality of Evil Reconsidered: SS Mid-Level Managers of Extermination through Work”, pg. 261

[14] Allen, “The Banality of Evil Reconsidered: SS Mid-Level Managers of Extermination through Work”, pp. 270-274

[15] Allen, “The Banality of Evil Reconsidered: SS Mid-Level Managers of Extermination through Work”, pp. 275-84

[16] Allen, “The Banality of Evil Reconsidered: SS Mid-Level Managers of Extermination through Work”, pp. 282-284

[17] Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, pg. 467

[18] Henriech Himmler, quoted in Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, pg. 473

[19] Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, pg. 473

[20] Beyerchen, “Rational Means and Irrational Ends: Thoughts on the Technology of Racism in the Third Reich”, pg. 401

[21] Spoerer and Fleischhacker, “Forced Labourers in Nazi Germany: Categories, Numbers and Survivors”, pg. 184

[22] Spoerer and Fleischhacker, “Forced Labourers in Nazi Germany: Categories, Numbers and Survivors”, pg. 195

[23] Ulirch Albrecht, “Military Technology and National Socialist Ideology”, in Walker and Renneberg, eds., Science, Technology and National Socialism, pg. 88

[24] Albrecht, “Military Technology and National Socialist Ideology”, pg. 98

[25] Allen, “The Banality of Evil Reconsidered: SS Mid-Level Managers of Extermination through Work”, pp. 292-293

[26] Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, pp. 477-480

[27] Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, pg. 482

[28] Albrecht, “Military Technology and National Socialist Ideology”, pg. 95

[29] Spoerer and Fleischhacker, “Forced Labourers in Nazi Germany: Categories, Numbers and Survivors”, pg. 203

[30] Spoerer and Fleischhacker, “Forced Labourers in Nazi Germany: Categories, Numbers and Survivors”, pg. 201

[31] Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, pg. 520

[32] Beyerchen, “Rational Means and Irrational Ends: Thoughts on the Technology of Racism in the Third Reich”, pg. 401

[33] Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, pg. 528

[34] Spoerer and Fleischhacker, “Forced Labourers in Nazi Germany: Categories, Numbers and Survivors”, pg. 203